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Abstract 
We use enterprise data to analyse and compare the determinants of enterprise performance in 
China and Russia. We find that in China, enterprise growth and efficiency is associated with rapid 
increases in factor inputs including management, as well as TFP, but not greatly associated with 
ownership or institutional factors. In contrast, sales growth in Russia is not associated with 
improvements in factor quantity (except for labor) or quality; TFP is not influenced by 
competition and privatization to outsiders does not enhance company performance relative to 
insider ownership. The main determinants of TFP are instead demand and institutional factors at a 
regional level. 
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Non-Technical Summary 
 
There has been a marked contrast in economic performance between Russia and China 
since each embarked on the path of transition from socialist planning.  In attempting to 
understand the contrast, analysts have cited differences in preconditions, notably the low 
level of industrialization in China; differences in policy frameworks  – gradualism in 
China as against “big bang” policies in Russia; and differences in policy sequencing i.e. 
delayed rather than immediate privatization in China but not Russia.  
 
There are a number of factors likely to contribute to growth in relatively less developed 
economies transforming from central planning to markets.  The first is the transfer of 
factor inputs from low to high productivity uses.  In the case of less industrialised 
economies, such as China, much of that transfer might take the form of labor shifts from 
agriculture to industry and industrial capital accumulation. In Russia, with “over-
industrialization” and a pre-transition domestic relative price structure inconsistent with 
world prices, factor reallocation could take the form of capital and labor flows to sectors 
of international comparative advantage.  At the same time, the price and foreign trade 
liberalisation inherent to transition is likely to lead to enhanced competition, which might 
act to increase total factor productivity (TFP).  TFP could also be increased by the 
decentralisation of the enterprise sector, giving autonomy to managers so that variance in 
the quality or effectiveness in management becomes an important determinant of 
enterprise performance. The improved incentives for management as a result of 
ownership changes could also enhance enterprise performance.  There is a large literature 
to suggest privatization acts to increase enterprise efficiency and profitability, though, the 
results for the transition economies are not so clear cut because the ownership forms 
which emerged post-privatization were too dispersed, and because the legal and 
institutional environment was not always sufficiently well developed. This latter finding 
suggests that institutional factors – political, legal, regional and industrial – may also play 
a significant role in determining company performance, especially in countries as 
regionally diverse as Russia or China. 
 
In this paper, we explore the relative impact of these determinants of enterprise growth in 
matched random panels of firms in Russia and China.  Our questionnaire was designed to 
yield unique and comparable data about competition, technology, ownership and 
managerial activity, as well as concerning institutions and factor inputs.  The strength of 
the study is its comparative nature; while our findings are for the most part consistent 
with those in the separate large literatures on enterprise performance in Russia and China, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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we obtain additional robustness and insight from the estimation of common equations, 
and the resulting direct comparison of determining factors. We find that in China 
enterprise performance can be associated with rapid increases in factor inputs including 
management and TFP, but is not greatly associated with ownership or institutional 
factors.  In contrast, sales growth in Russia is not driven by improvements in factor 
quantity (except for labor) or quality, TFP is not influenced by competition or managerial 
effort, and privatization to outsiders is not found to improve performance relative to 
insider owner firms.  Our equations provide an equivalent level of explanation in Russia 
and China but in Russia the main determinants of sales growth in addition to employment 
are demand and region-specific factors. 
 
These findings cast some light on several important policy debates. They suggest that 
there were serious flaws in the “big bang” reform strategy adapted in Russia, though it is 
unclear whether these were in the design or implementation of policy. The null 
hypothesis is however not well specified; it is not clear that alternative, more gradual and 
partial, strategies were a realistic option in Russia in the early 1990s. Further, it is not 
evident whether the Chinese reforms process itself is optimal, given the concerns about 
the health of the Chinese public sector banks and the resultant quasi-fiscal obligations of 
the government. However, the effectiveness of reforms which liberalise markets while 
leaving ownership unchanged or only partially adjusted, seems to be strongly supported 
by our Chinese findings.  We confirm that state owned and semi-privatised firms in China 
are responding to market signals and increasing total factor productivity along the same 
lines as privately owned firms in market economies, even when they are located in inland 
China where the spillovers from foreign direct investment are limited compared to that in 
the coastal and southern regions of the country. This suggests that in certain contexts such 
as the one of modern China, market incentives are sufficient to ensure some degree of 
efficiency in enterprise actively without immediate full privatisation.  This is not to say 
that performance cannot be further improved by private ownership; indeed the evidence 
is strong that privatization improves enterprise performance. But it is consistent with the 
view that neither “big bang” reform policies nor early privatisation are the sine qua non 
for successful transition. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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1.  Introduction 
 
There has been a marked contrast in economic performance between Russia and China since each 
embarked on the path of transition from socialist planning.  China’s GDP per capita has increased 
by 8% per annum between 1978 and 2000, while Russian GDP had fallen to 64% of its 1990 level 
by 2000, with output declining in seven years of the ten.  In attempting to understand the contrast, 
analysts have cited differences in preconditions, notably the low level of industrialization in 
China (see Sachs and Woo, 1997); differences in policy frameworks  – gradualism in China as 
against “big bang” policies in Russia (see Jefferson and Rawski, 1994, World Bank, 1996); and 
differences in policy sequencing i.e. delayed rather than immediate privatization in China but not 
Russia (see Stiglitz, 1999, Nellis, 2000, Estrin, 2002).  In this paper, we use comparable 
enterprise level data to analyse and contrast the determinants of company performance in China 
and Russia, in a manner which throws light on these broader issues. 
 
There are a number of factors likely to contribute to growth in relatively less developed 
economies transforming from central planning to markets.  The first is the transfer of factor inputs 
from low to high productivity uses.  In the case of less industrialised economies, such as China, 
much of that transfer might take the form of labor shifts from agriculture to industry and 
industrial capital accumulation. In Russia, with “over-industrialization” and a pre-transition 
domestic relative price structure inconsistent with world prices, factor reallocation could take the 
form of capital and labor flows to sectors of international comparative advantage.  At the same 
time, the price and foreign trade liberalisation inherent to transition (see Svejnar, 2002) is likely 
to lead to enhanced competition, which might act to increase total factor productivity (TFP) (see 
Nickell, 1996).  TFP could also be increased by the decentralisation of the enterprise sector, 
giving autonomy to managers so that variance in the quality or effectiveness in management 
becomes an important determinant of enterprise performance (see Claessens and Djankov, 1999, 
Muravyev, 2002).  The improved incentives for management as a result of ownership changes 
could also enhance enterprise performance (see Vickers and Yarrow, 1988).  There is a large 
literature to suggest privatization acts to increase enterprise efficiency and profitability (see 
Megginson and Netter, 2001), though, as Djankov and Murrell (2000) show, the results for the 
transition economies are not so clear cut because the ownership forms which emerged post-
privatization were too dispersed, and because the legal and institutional environment was not 
always sufficiently well developed (see also Estrin, 2002).  This latter finding suggests that 
institutional factors – political, legal, regional and industrial – may also play a significant role in 
determining company performance, especially in countries as regionally diverse as Russia or 
China (see Granick, 1990, Tsui, 1996, Granville and Oppenheimer, 2001). 
 
In this paper, we explore the relative impact of these determinants of enterprise growth in 
matched random panels of firms in Russia and China.  Our questionnaire was designed to yield 
unique and comparable data about competition, technology, ownership and managerial activity, 
as well as concerning institutions and factor inputs.  The strength of the study is its comparative William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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nature; while our findings are for the most part consistent with those in the separate large 
literatures on enterprise performance in Russia
1 and China,
2 we obtain additional robustness and 
insight from the estimation of common equations, and the resulting direct comparison of 
determining factors.
3  We find that in China enterprise performance can be associated with rapid 
increases in factor inputs including management and TFP, but is not greatly associated with 
ownership or institutional factors.  In contrast, sales growth in Russia is not driven by 
improvements in factor quantity (except for labor) or quality, TFP is not influenced by 
competition or managerial effort, and privatization to outsiders is not found to improve 
performance relative to insider owner firms.  Our equations provide an equivalent level of 
explanation in Russia and China but in Russia the main determinants of sales growth in addition 
to employment are demand and region-specific factors. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section we outline our 
hypotheses, taking into account both economic theory and the particular institutional environment 
of Russia and China.  The resulting estimation framework is presented in third section along with 
the datasets.  The findings are presented in the fourth section and conclusions are in the fifth. 
 
2.  The Determinants of Enterprise Growth in Russia and China 
 
In this section, we outline the conceptual framework and outline the hypotheses implied by the 
Chinese and Russian historical and institutional environments.  Our approach is based on 
estimation of augmented production functions using data from Russian and Chinese firms.  We 
assume that the technology of each firm, i, can be represented by, 
 
M K L A Y i i i i i
δ β α γ =     ( 1 )  
 
where  Y measures output, L is labor, K is capital, A is the “technology” parameter and M 
measures the quality of management.  The latter variable is included explicitly in our formulation 
                                                      
1  See for example Blasi (1997), Earle and Estrin (1998), Estrin and Wright (1999) Brown 
and Earle (2001), Brown and Brown (1999), and Djankov and Murrell (2000) for a 
survey. 
2  See for example Jefferson and Rawski (1994), Li (1999), Jefferson et al. (1996), Woo 
(1994), and Jefferson et al. (2000).  
3  For example, in previous work (e.g. Bevan et al., 2002) it has been hard to decide 
whether the disappointing results on Russian enterprise performance, with limited input 
from competition, privatization or investment, arose from sampling or measurement 
problems, methodological weaknesses or because non-economic factors were driving 
Russian enterprise performance e.g. as in Earle and Estrin (1997).  In this paper, 
equations with comparable standards of fit provide clear evidence that, though economic 
factors do not for the most part influence performance in Russia but as in e.g. Jefferson 
and Rawski (1994), they do in China.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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because managerial quality and effort is seen as a major independent factor influencing enterprise 
performance in transition countries (see e.g. Barberis et al., 1996, Blanchard and Aghion, 1996).  
As planning systems were decentralised and firms gained autonomy, the variance in managerial 
competence and effort may have become an important explanation of the differences in enterprise 
performance (see Granick, 1990, Claessens and Djankov, 1999). 
 
Output (value added) data is scarce and typically of poor quality in transition economies, so, with 
other analysts in the field, (see e.g. Frydman et al., 1999), we have used sales (S), where 
 
M K L PA Y P S i i i i i i
δ β α γ = ≡        (2) 
 
and P is the product price of the good being produced.  The price is determined by net demand in 
the relevant market and the competitive structure of that market, i.e.   
 
P  =  P(Q,  C)       (3) 
 
where Q is net demand in the industry and C is a measure of competition.    
 
Because the transition process is essentially one of change, our analysis is focused towards 
growth of sales; levels of output or input in transition economies are often determined by 
historical or institutional factors of limited relevance in the new market environment.  Hence, 
denoting time differences by a dot, 
 
()
δ β α γ
i i i i i M K L A P S
. . . . . .
=      (4) 
 
This framework effectively categorises the determinants of sales growth into four groups: 
changes in product price (itself a function of net demand and market structure changes); changes 
in factor inputs (L and K) including changes in factor quality; changes in total factor productivity 
(TFP) which, in the transition context, are primarily be affected by ownership structure and 
competition (see Frydman et al., 1999, Djankov and Murrell, 2000); and changes in management 
activities, which for firms in transition can be measured by the extent of restructuring activity (see 
Estrin, Gelb and Singh, 1995). 
 
To sharpen the hypotheses, we must briefly compare the two economies at the point of transition 
(1978 and 1991 respectively) and beyond, to establish points of similarity and difference.
4  China 
                                                      
4  This discussion is necessarily brief and summarises two huge literatures (see e.g. World 
Bank, 1996, Boycko et al., 1995, EBRD, 1999, Groves et al., 1994, 1995, Granick, 1990, 
Jefferson and Rawski, 1994, Roland, 2000). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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and Russia both embarked on their transition paths from more or less unreformed systems of 
central planning,
5 though Chinese planning was never so complete as Russian, and operated 
through regional structures rather than industrial ministries (see Qian et al., 1999).  The Chinese 
economy therefore suffered, within the almost entirely state owned industrial sector from similar 
problems of incentives, soft budget constraints and inadequate information, with well-known 
negative implications for company efficiency, innovation, and growth (see e.g. Ellman, 1989, 
Dewatripont and Roland, 1995).  Indeed, in Russia at the time when transition began, there was 
an almost total absence of the institutional and legal infrastructure necessary for the operation of 
competitive markets (see Commander, Fan, Schaffer, 1996, Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). 
 
However, there were also very marked differences in initial conditions.  China was a much less 
developed economy in 1978 than Russia in 1991; for example in GNP per capita (US$ 285 as 
against US$ 3783); share of industrial employment, 13.3% as against 39%) and share of 
agricultural employment (75% as against 13.5%).
6  In particular, the stock of human capital was 
markedly lower in China, with a literacy rate in 1980 of 66% as against 98% in Russia, 1998); 
secondary school enrolment rates of 63% as against 91% and tertiary education enrolments of 
1.7%, 1980) as against 50%. This meant that the two countries faced fundamentally different 
resource reallocation challenges. In China, it was necessary to raise national income by 
transferring labor from low productivity activities (primarily agriculture) to higher productivity 
ones (largely in industry) (see Qian, 2000, Granick, 1990).  In Russia, the pattern of final demand 
has had to be rebalanced from a concentration on the pattern preferred by central planners (heavy 
industry, defence) towards domestic consumer demand (light industry, services) and activities of 
international comparative advantage at world prices (see Hanson, 2002). 
 
The two countries also followed very different transition paths (see World Bank, 1996, Stiglitz, 
1999).  In China, reforms were gradual, experimental, and partial, with the authorities taking a 
flexible approach to policy making (see Qian et al., 1999).  In Russia, in principle, the reforms 
were rapid and comprehensive (see Hanson, 2002), the caveat being the wedge between the 
principle and actual implementation of reforms in that country. This had important implications 
for the sequence of transition in the two countries. In China, markets were liberalised first, and 
they have gradually become more competitive and efficient in resource allocation (see Jeffeson 
and Rawski, 1994). Hence, strong market-based incentives were provided to state owned firms 
and semi-private ones such as the town-village enterprises (TVEs) while the process of 
privatization has been much slower and more limited (see Jefferson et al., 2000, Cao et al., 1999).  
In contrast, Russia attempted virtually simultaneous introduction of markets and private 
ownership from the outset, with much of the intended enhancement to company performance 
presumed to derive from the latter (see Boycko et al., 1995).  The implementation of Russian 
                                                      
5  In contrast, for example, to Hungary or Yugoslavia (see Fisher and Gelb, 1991). 
6  Sources: World Bank, IMF and State Statistical Bureau, GNP per capita in Russia, 1988 
and share of industrial and agricultural employment 1980. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
  8
reforms, however, proved harder than expected, (see Granville and Oppenheimer, 2001), leaving 
enterprises to operate in only a quasi-market environment (see Commander et al., 2002), and with 
a prolonged recession. 
 
Therefore in China, one can hypothesise that growth in the industrial sector has resulted from 
strong demand (domestic and international) and deriving from factor transfers (labor and capital), 
and TFP growth driven by competition (see Wang and Yao, 2001).  Once might also expect some 
contribution from enhanced factor quality, management and private ownership, though a limited 
one given the level of development and the transition path (but see Huang and Duncan, 1997).  
Given that a relatively competitive market system had been established by the time of our study 
in 1999, specific institutional factors related to industry or regions might be expected to be of less 
significance (see Parker, 1997). 
 
One would predict similar factors as being relevant in Russia, but the balance of importance 
might be different (see Granville and Oppenheimer, 2001).  One would clearly expect the change 
in sales, driven by demand, would be closely correlated with changes in factor inputs.  Given 
Russia’s more advanced level of technological and educational development, one might also 
expect a strong influence of factor quality on sales growth.  If Russia’s “big bang” reform 
programme had been effective, one would also expect to see, fairly rapidly, a major impact on 
TFP from ownership changes, and from product market competition (see Bevan et al., 2002).  
However, given that the period of transition is Russia has been rather shorter and more 
problematic than that in China, one might also expect to see greater significance of sectoral and 
region-specific factors (see Djankov and Murrell, 2000, Nellis, 2000). 
 
3.  Specification and Data 
 
3.1.  Specification of the Estimating Equations 
Equation (4) is a reduced form relationship which is commonly estimated log-linearly and in rate 
of change form (∆) to remove firm-specific effects so, with error term εi; 
 
∆lnSi = α ∆ln Li + β∆ln Ki + γ∆lnA + δ∆lnMi + φ∆lnQi + σ∆lnCi  + εI  (5) 
 
In this section, we outline the dataset, and the ways that the variables in equation (5) have been 
specified for empirical estimation.  It is often difficult to obtain direct measures of A, M, Q and C 
as continuous variables, especially in transition economics. Hence (5) is modified so that L and K 
are included in logarithmic form, while proxies for the other variables are included as dummy 
variables. For a measure of the management input during the relevant time period, we use an William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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aggregate count of qualitative indicators of restructuring activity undertaken during that period, 
denoted RE.
7   
 
The variable A represents total factor productivity and is influenced by several variables.  In the 
literature on privatization, it is argued that TFP varies according to ownership type,  for example 
being higher in private than state owned firms (see Megginson and Netter, 2001).  The transition 
literature additionally argues that TFP is a function of the type of private ownership, with outsider 
ownership expected to generate higher productivity than insider or state (Blanchard and Aghion, 
1996, Roland, 2000).  In our estimating equations, we use a variety of ownership dummies (O) to 
proxy for alternative ownership forms in each country.
8 We also control for the quality of capital 
and the quality of the labor force,
9 the proxy for capital quality being the proportion of productive 
capital that was less than 5 years old, and that for labour quality being the ratio of part time to full 
time laborers. The qualitative indicators of changes in competitive pressures are derived from 
management responses in the survey and subdivided into domestic (DC) and international (IC) 
competition.  We control for (net) demand using industry dummy variables (IS) and for region-
                                                      
7  The measures of restructuring achieved by a Chinese firm during 1995-99 and by a 
Russian firm during 1997-99 have been obtained from qualitative data, the basis for 
which are the responses of the management of the surveyed firms to a series of questions.  
Specifically, Russian firms were asked whether they had undertaken 15 different types of 
restructuring during 1997-99. A dummy variable has been used to capture their yes-no 
response for each type of restructuring, such that RE for Russia is a score on a 0-15 scale.  
Chinese firms, on the other hand, were asked similar questions about 32 different forms 
of restructuring, and were asked to rank their success in implementing each type of 
restructuring on a 1 - 5 scale.  Hence, RE for China is a score on a 32-160 scale. 
8  As discussed earlier, the ownership issues are different in China and in Russia. In the 
Chinese context, it is important to distinguish between firms in which the state has 
controlling stake and those in which non-state entities have controlling stake, along the 
lines of the standard literature (e.g. Megginson and Netter, 2001); insider ownership as 
has emerged in much of Central and Eastern Europe is not a significant issue, given that 
our sample does not contain TVEs. In Russia, however, privatisation was widespread, 
and indeed almost all firms in our sample are private but the dominant owners are rarely 
outsiders in the western sense (see Earle and Estrin, 1997).  Hence the most meaningful 
distinction in Russia, in so far as ownership is concerned, is between firms in which 
insiders have controlling stake and firms that are controlled by outsiders (see Djankov 
and Murrell, 2000). Further, in Russia, the government retained 25 percent or more shares 
in some privatised firms, thereby giving them a significant amount of say in the decision 
making process (see Bennett, Estrin and Maw, 2001).  This factor too should be taken 
into account in considering for the quality of managerial input in Russian enterprises. 
Hence ownership variable is defined differently in the Russian and Chinese contexts. 
9  The proxy for “technology” in this study is the proportion of capital stock of an 
enterprise that is less than 5 years old.  For labor quality we use the ratio of managerial to 
blue collar workers. But since the variable’s coefficient is never significant, it is excluded 
from the reported regressions. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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specific factors influencing enterprise performance with regional dummies variables (Ri). To the 
extent that the markets in China and Russia are not fully integrated, the regional dummies may 
pick up local demand effects. They may also pick up inter-regional differences in institutional 
factors like the legal environment and governance. We attempt to distinguish between the impact 
of local net demand and institutional factors later in our analysis.  
The specification is therefore given by, 
  ∆ln Si = λ0 + α ∆ln Li + β∆ln Ki + γA + λ1Oi + λ2 REi  + λ3 DCi + λ4 ICi + 
Σ
1λ5k IS
1 + Σj λ6 j Rj + εI .       (6) 
 
In keeping with the earlier discussion, α, β and γ are expected to be positive reflecting the 
stylised production function relationship between output-sales and factor inputs and 
technology.  Similarly, restructuring is expected to have a positive impact on sales growth, 
such that λ2 is expected to have a positive sign.  In the presence of stylised Cournot-type 
market dynamics, the magnitude of sales growth might be expected to vary inversely with 
the extent of competition faced by an enterprise.  On the other hand, recent models suggest 
that higher TFP is associated with increased competition (see Nickell, 1996).  Hence our 
predictions on the signs of λ3 and λ4, are ambiguous.  The impact of ownership on sales 
growth is also complicated. In principle, government control in China and Russia can be 
expected to have an adverse impact on sales growth relative to outsider ownership (see 
Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, Nellis, 2000). But, in the light of the relevant literature (see 
Blanchard and Aghion, 1996, Estrin and Wright, 1999, Djankov and Murrell, 2000), it is not 
clear whether privatization to insiders would generate similar improvements in performance 
relative to state ownership.  The theory suggest that, at the very least, outsider ownership 
will be more efficient than insider or state, but that insider ownership may not yield 
significantly superior performance to state ownership.  Similarly, we do not offer any clear 
propositions about the impact of region-specific factors on sales growth, except perhaps that 
Russian firms in the large conurbations - the Moscow and St. Petersburg regions - might be 
expected to perform better, on average, than firms in other parts of the country. 
 
3.2  Chinese and Russian Data 
The data on Chinese firms, most of which were largely or entirely state owned, were collected 
through a random survey of manufacturing firms in the Sha’anxi, Hunan and Shanxi provinces of 
China, and yielded 274 observations (see Tlusty Sheen, 2001). The firms belong to a wide array 
of mining and manufacturing industries,
10 and the sample includes about 20% of the firms in the 
underlying population. The responses to the survey questionnaire provide information about, 
                                                      
10  The industries are mining, light industries, engineering products, chemicals and 
utilities. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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among other things, ownership of the firms, volume of sales, stock and quality of factor inputs, 
the extent of competition faced by the firms in the product market, and the extent of restructuring 
in the 32 different operational areas, for the 1995-99 period.  
 
The Russian dataset contains information on 437 firms surveyed across 13 provinces
11 and six 
industries
12 (see Bevan et al., 2002, for further information).  As with the Chinese data, the 
stratified random survey of Russian manufacturing provided information about the volume of 
sales, stock of inputs the nature of competition faced by firms in the product market, and the 
extent of restructuring in 15 different operational areas, for the 1997-99 period.
13 The data for 
these firms, almost all of which had been privatised before 1997, also provides information about 
the proportion of equity owned by the insiders and the government. Thus the matched samples 
compare privatised Russian firms in some of the main industrial regions of the country with 
largely state owned firms in some of the less central and more internally oriented provinces of 
China. The sample years for Russia include the post-1998 recession. 
 
The data from both Russia and China have missing value problems. In particular, a number of 
firms did not provide full breakdown of equity stakes, and/or information about capital stock. 
Since ownership and capital stock are important determinants of a firm’s performance, as 
indicated by its growth of sales, observations with incomplete information about these variables 
had to be dropped. It is not clear how non-reporting might be associated with performance, and 
there was no obvious pattern by sector, region, size and sales growth. Eventually, we were left 
with 138 usable observations for China and 279 usable observations for Russia. 
 
                                                      
11  The regions are Moscow, Moscow oblast, St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg oblast, Nizny 
Novgorod, Samari, Ekaterinburg, Perm, Novosibirik, Kiasnayovsk, Volgograd, 
Chelyabirsk, and Omsk. 
12  The industrial categories are chemicals, machinery, wood and paper, construction 
material, light industry, and food processing. There were, however, 18 “special” firms in 
the sample which did not wholly belong to any of these six industries. Hence, a seventh 
industrial category – other – was created for these firms. 
13  The survey was based on random sampling from a population list from Goskomstat 
Enterprise Registry, for the six Russian Industries Classification’s (OKONH) two digit 
sector. The size of the sampled firms was restricted to between 100 and 5000 employees, 
so as to rule out both small and medium enterprises and the huge Russian resource 
companies which, though important economically, are atypical. The sample was stratified 
to distribute firms more or less evenly across three size classes: 100-500 employees, 501-
1000 employees, and 1001-5000 employees. The stratification process led to certain 
biases in the sample relative to the Goskomstat data for industrial enterprises, e.g., over-
representation of chemicals relative to machine building. Bevan et al. (2000) also report 
some bias in favor of more profitable firms. None of these biases seem likely to explain 
the estimation results to any significant extent. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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The descriptive statistics in Table 1 highlight the patterns of evolution of the Russian and the 
Chinese firms over the period and are consistent with the macro-economic data (see, e.g., EBRD, 
2001).  First, as one would expect, the state had controlling stake in most Chinese firms in our 
sample, while the majority of the Russian firms are controlled by insiders (see Qian, 2000, Earle 
and Estrin, 1997). Second, even though the real sales of an average Chinese firm in our sample 
grew between 1995 and 1999, while the real sales of an average Russian firm in our sample 
declined, sales per laborer in Russian firms remained higher that that in Chinese firms even after 
the recession in 1998 and even after the adverse impact of the sharp depreciation of the rouble on 
the US dollar value of the sales of the former. Further, there was real sales growth in a large 
minority of Russian firms. Third, the size of the labor force for both Russian and Chinese firms 
declined over time, indicating some degree of restructuring in both countries that involved laying 
off surplus laborers. Fourth, while the real capital stock (valued at historic cost) of an average 
Chinese firm grew substantially over the 1995-99 period, an average Russian firm experienced 
severe real decapitalisation during 1997-99, rather more markedly than the decline in demand.
14  
Finally, a greater proportion of Russian firms in our sample faced competition from foreign 
competitors than Chinese firms,
15 possibly reflecting the fact that the Chinese firms surveyed are 
from the more insulated inland provinces (though Earle and Estrin, 1998, and Brown and Earle, 
2001, also note that Russian industry faces quite stiff competition in its home market). We are 
unable to compare the extent of restructuring activity in the Chinese and Russian firms because it 
was measured on different scales in the two countries (see footnote 7). 
 
4.  Regression Results 
 
The regression results are presented in Tables (2) through (5). The empirical analysis is developed 
as follows: first, we have estimated the specification given in equation (6) using the Chinese and 
Russian data (Table 2). As mentioned above, the specifications for China and Russia are slightly 
different, on account of the difference in the nature of ownership and impact of ownership on firm 
performance in the two countries. Further, as explained in footnote 10, the measure of RE is also 
different across the two countries. Hence, equation (6) was estimated separately using the data 
from the two countries. The specification estimated with the Chinese data includes one ownership 
variable: a dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm was state-owned during the 1995-99 
period. The specification estimated using the Russian data, on the other hand, has two variables 
                                                      
14 This decapitalisation could be a consequence of Russian firms either selling assets or 
writing off unproductive capital in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis. 
15  Herfindahl indices, the stylised measure of the extent of competitiveness of an 
industry/sector, are not available for Chinese and Russian industries. Mindful of this 
lacuna in the available data, the survey instruments used in China and Russia asked the 
management of the firms whether or not they faced competition from other domestic 
firms, and foreign firms. The percentages stated in Table 1 were generated on the basis of 
the dummy variables – with value 1 if a firm faced a certain type of competition, and 0 
otherwise – that were created on the basis of this information. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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capturing the impact of insider ownership and residual government control: a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not insiders – managers and laborers – hold a majority stake in a firm 
during 1997-99, and another dummy variable indicating whether the government controls 25% or 
more of its equity during the same period, a stake which we could have given the government 
significant influence over strategic and operational decisions of the firm. 
 
Moreover, since it can be argued that ownership (O) itself determines managerial effort, we 
estimated two different specifications for both China and Russia: one in which the proxies for 
managerial input are both ownership and the extent of restructuring (Spec. 1 in Tables 2 through 
4), and another in which ownership alone is the proxy for managerial input (Spec 2 in Tables 2 
through 4).
16 
 
Second, in order to check for the robustness of the results presented in Table 2, we used an 
alternative yet related measure of firm performance, namely, proportional sales growth, which 
can be defined as ∆ln S/ln S0: the rate of growth (of sales). This measure of performance takes 
into account the initial size of the firm. We estimated the two specifications presented in Table 2 
– one with and one without the measure of enterprise restructuring – using Chinese and Russian 
data, after substituting the growth rate of sales, the dependent variable for the models presented in 
Table 2, with the proportional growth of sales of the firms. The coefficient estimates of the 
models that have this second order measure of performance as the dependent variable are 
presented in Table 3. 
 
Third, as we shall see later, a very significant part of the inter-firm variation in sales growth in 
Russia is explained by regional dummy variables that were included in the specification to 
capture the impact of institutions – or the cross-regional difference thereof – on the growth of the 
firms. Indeed, almost none of the explanatory variables that owe their inclusion in equation (6) to 
economic theory have coefficients that are significantly different from zero. Since the data for the 
Russian firms span the 1997-99 period, and given that the debt and currency crises in Russia in 
1998 may have affected the performance of the firms in a way that is not adequately captured by 
the specification, we estimated equation (6) using data on Russian firms separately for the 1997-
98 and 1998-99 periods (Table 4). If the results for the Russian firms, presented in Tables 2 and 3, 
are driven by the events in 1998, the factors determining the growth of sales of these firms would 
be noticeably different in 1998-99 as compared with 1997-98. 
                                                      
16  In other words, RE might be endogenous. The omitted variable version of the Hausman 
test (see Kennedy, 1998, p. 150-1) indicates that this indeed is the case. However, the 
surveys do not provide for good instruments and hence the IV equations are weak; the 
coefficients of the plausible instruments are not significant. Hence, RE was not 
instrumented and, as we shall see later, two specifications – one including RE and the 
other without RE – were estimated. The decision to not use IV technique in the face of 
weak IV regressions is by no means unique and unprecedented. See, for example, 
Bhaumik and Nugent (1999). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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Finally, since institutional factors seem to have played such an important role in determining firm 
performance in Russia, and since dummy variables by themselves do not indicate the relative 
importance of the different types of institutions, we estimated equation (6) by substituting the 
regional dummy variables with variables that capture the characteristics of the regions (Table 5). 
Specifically, we used the Berkowitz and DeJong (2001) variables capturing inter-regional 
economic and institutional differences in Russia.
17  We also estimated specifications in which 
sectoral relative prices were used instead of industry dummies, but these regressions were found 
to be inferior in terms of goodness of fit and are therefore not reported. 
 
The regression results presented in Table 2 indicate that in China, growth of sales is positively 
correlated with changes in factor inputs (i.e., α, β > 0) and negatively correlated with competition 
(i.e., λ3 < 0). Managerial input is not significant however in  this specification.  Note that neither 
the signs nor the magnitudes of the significant coefficients are much different across 
specifications 1 and 2. These findings are consistant with those of other empirical studies on 
China (e.g. Jefferson et al., 1996, Jefferson et al., 2000).  In the Russian context, on the other 
hand, variation in the growth rate of sales across firms can largely be explained by industry-
specific (IS) and region-specific (R) factors. The economic variables that have significant 
conditional correlation with the growth of sales in the Russian context are the quantity of labor 
(i.e.,  α > 0) and the dummy variable capturing significant (i.e., greater than 25 percent) 
government equity stake in a firm, both with the predicted sign. Outsider ownership is found to 
have the same effect on performance as insider ownership. Once again, both the signs and the 
magnitudes of the significant coefficients are preserved across the two alternative specifications. 
In other words, in both the Chinese and the Russian contexts, the coefficient estimates are robust 
with respect to the inclusion of managerial effort in the specification, and this is also reflected in 
the similar values of the R-square statistic across the two specifications for both China and 
Russia. The R-square values – 0.25 and 0.42 for China and Russia respectively – and the F-
statistic indicate that our specification explains variations in sales growth across fairly well.   
However, the Chinese data yield a fairly well specified conventional revenue function, with both 
factor inputs and other variables significant, while, as in other studies (see Estrin and Wright, 
1999, or Djankov and Murrell, 2000, for a summary) the Russian data yield an equation with 
more limited economic interpretation.   
 
                                                      
17  Berkowitz and DeJong (2001) have a number of variables highlighting the differences 
among the regions of Russia. However, predictably, the variables are highly correlated, 
and after taking into consideration the possible multicollinearity problems we were able 
to use five of the variables: industrial growth during 1997-99, unemployment in 1998, per 
capita gross regional product in 1997, proportion of debt that was overdue in 1998, and 
index of legislative quality in 1997. The first three variables are proxies for regional 
demand, while the fourth and fifth variables are proxies for the strength of market 
institutions and enforceability of contracts in the regions. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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Table 3 reports the coefficients of the variables explaining inter-enterprise variation in firm 
performance when performance is measured not by the growth of sales but by the proportional 
growth of sales. It can be seen that this change in the measure of performance significantly 
improves the results involving the Chinese firms. The rate of growth of sales of the Chinese firms 
in our sample not only varies positively with changes in factor inputs (i.e., α,  β > 0) and 
negatively with competition (i.e., λ3  < 0), as earlier, but also has a significant conditional 
correlation with technology (i.e., γ > 0). Once again, signs and magnitudes of the significant 
coefficients estimates are not affected by the inclusion of the indicator of managerial activity in 
the specification, but this is found to have a weakly significant independent effect in China.  The 
R-square value correspondingly improves from 0.25 (see Table 2) to 0.3, suggesting it is 
important to control for initial size in explaining Chinese enterprise sales growth. 
 
The variation in the rate of sales growth across Russian firms however is, once again, explained 
primarily by industry-specific and region-specific factors. As before, change in the size of the 
labor force is shown to have varied positively with this second order measure of performance 
(i.e., α > 0), while significant (i.e., more than 25 percent) government stake in firms are once 
again seen to have had a negative impact on the proportional growth rate of sales of firms. As 
before, the estimates are robust with respect to the inclusion of RE in the specification but 
managerial activity exerts no independent influence on performance.  However, the R-square 
value – still very reasonable – declines marginally from 0.42 to 0.38, suggesting no underlying 
relationship between firm size and growth in Russian enterprises. 
 
Table 4 presents the regression estimates for the two aforementioned specifications – one 
including and the other excluding a measure for managerial effort – for Russia, for the 1997-98 
and 1998-99 time periods.  The purpose of this exercise is to verify whether the Russian debt and 
currency crises of 1998 is driving the result – presented in Tables 2 and 3 – that industry-specific 
and region-specific/institutional factors are influencing performance of Russian firms rather than 
the “economic” variables. The regression results indicate that in each of these two periods – 
1997-98 and 1998-99 – changes in factor inputs capital and labor were correlated with growth of 
sales (i.e., α, β > 0). While the significance of capital, absent in the results presented in Tables 2 
and 3, is a welcome improvement, the coefficient is actually found to be negative in the 1998-99 
period, probably reflecting a slow adjustment of the capital stock to the output shock.  Managerial 
effort, competition, capital quality and ownership continue to play no role in explaining Russian 
enterprise performance in either year.  Even before the 1998 recession, much of the variation in 
sales growth across firms is thus explained by region-specific factors. 
 
What inference can we draw from the fact that while, in China, economic factors like 
changes in labor and capital, the level of technology and managerial activity explain 
inter-firm variation in growth and proportional growth of sales, in Russia most of this 
variation is explained by region-specific factors? The first and the more obvious William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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implication of this result is that, unlike in China, the Russian market remains fragmented 
both in the geographical and institutional sense, an observation that is consistent with our 
knowledge about the political economy of economic governance in Russia and China (see 
e.g. Hanson, 2002, Mau, 2000, Granick, 1990). 
 
Which institutional variables are likely to have a significant impact on enterprise 
performance, however? Berkowitz and DeJong (2001) have explained in detail the 
determinants of differential growth rates across regions in Russia, and provide a useful 
source of information about inter-regional differences in demand, infrastructure, legal 
arrangements, political orientation and corruption. Most of these variables are highly 
correlated with each other, and hence one has to be careful about the choice of variables 
to be included in a regression specification. After some experimentation, we selected the 
variables which had the greatest impact on enterprise performance (on the basis of 
goodness of fit) and yet were not highly correlated with each other.  Table 5 reports the 
coefficient estimates. Since the results presented in Tables 2 through 4 have shown that 
the coefficient estimates are robust with respect to the inclusion of a measure of 
managerial effort in the specification, in Table 5 we present only one of the two 
alternative specifications, the one that includes RE. The results indicate that regional 
unemployment rate, a proxy for regional demand, and the regional index for legislative 
quality, a proxy for the quality of regional institutions, are the region-specific variables 
that have most significant impact on enterprise performance as measured by growth of 
sales.
18 Further, use of regional dummy variables and the Berkowitz and DeJong 
variables provide an equivalent amount of explanation for the inter-firm variation in 
performance. This indicates that the significance of the regional dummies in the previous 
equations is indeed proxying for a combination of local demand and institutional/legal 
factors. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have estimated comparable equations across enterprise samples in China 
and Russia seeking to understand the determinants of changing enterprise performance.  
The surveys are particularly interesting in bringing into contrast samples of firms from 
more isolated inland regions in China with companies from across Russia, including 
leading centres such as Moscow and St Petersburg. China commenced the transition more 
than twenty years ago, and has embraced a path of gradual change, with liberalisation of 
                                                      
18  The index accorded a value of 1-6 to each of the regions, 1 being the best and 6 the 
worst. Hence the negative sign of the coefficient. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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domestic and international markets first and, more recently, privatisation and capital 
market development. Russian reforms began only a decade ago, from a much longer 
heritage of industrialisation and central planning, and with an almost simultaneous and 
immediate liberalisation of markets and mass privatisation. 
 
Our findings, which are consistent with other individual country studies, suggest a clear 
contrast in outcomes between the two countries.  In China, enterprises appear to be 
responsive to market and supply phenomena – competition, managerial effort, technology 
and investment.  However, we find little impact from the extent of privatisation or from 
local or individual institutional factors.  In contrast, Russian firms are still unresponsive 
to most conventional economic drivers – outsider versus insider privatisation, 
management effort, competition or technological factors.  Nearly a decade after the start 
of transition, the primary determinants of enterprise performance in Russia remain 
region-specific primarily local demand and institutional factors, though we do identify a 
relationship between changes in sales and in employment. 
 
These findings cast some light on several important policy debates.  They suggest that 
there were serious flaws in the “big bang” reform strategy adapted in Russia, though it is 
unclear whether these were in the design or implementation of policy. The null 
hypothesis is however not well specified; it is not clear that alternative, more gradual and 
partial, strategies were a realistic option in Russia in the early 1990s (see Boycko et al., 
1995, Nellis, 2000). Further, it is not evident whether the Chinese reforms process itself 
is optimal, given the concerns about the health of the Chinese public sector banks and the 
resultant quasi-fiscal obligations of the government. However, the effectiveness of 
reforms which liberalise markets while leaving ownership unchanged or only partially 
adjusted, seems to be strongly supported by our Chinese findings.  We confirm that state 
owned and semi-privatised firms in China are responding to market signals and 
increasing total factor productivity along the same lines as privately owned firms in 
market economies (see Jefferson and Rawski, 1994), even when they are located in inland 
China where the spillovers from foreign direct investment are limited compared to that in 
the coastal and southern regions of the country. This suggests that in certain contexts such 
as the one of modern China, market incentives are sufficient to ensure some degree of 
efficiency in enterprise actively without immediate full privatisation.  This is not to say 
that performance cannot be further improved by private ownership; indeed the evidence 
is strong that privatization improves enterprise performance (see Megginson and Netter, 
2001).  But it is consistent with the view (see e.g. Stiglitz, 1999) that neither “big bang” 
reform policies nor early privatisation are the sine qua non for successful transition. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
China Russia   
Variables  1995 1999 1997 1999 
Percentage of firms state owned  79 66
Percentage of equity owned by 
government
 a 
12 7
Percentage of equity owned by insiders   73  62
Sales 
       Yuan/Rouble (thousands) 
       US dollars (thousands) 
26006.87
3114.60
 
28369.57 
3430.42
 
102694.20 
17705.90 
 
166151.20 
6754.11
Labor force  4279 3889 971  887
Stock of capital 
        Yuan/Rouble (thousands) 
        US dollars (thousands) 
 
22393.55 
2681.86
 
33604.21 
4063.39
 
157665.40 
27183.69 
 
78234.78 
3180.28
Percentage of capital stock that is less 
than 5 years old 
18 7
Percentage of firms facing competition 
from firms from other regions of the 
country 
86 82
Percentage of firms facing competition 
from firms from the rest of the world 
17 34
Measure of restructuring achieved by the 
firm since 1995 (China) or 1997 
(Russia)
c 
65
 
8
Notes:  a) Almost all Russian firms in the sample had been privatised by 1999. 
b) Measured as the ratio of temporary laborers to laborers with permanent/long term contracts. 
c) The scale for Chinese data is 32-160, while the range for the Russian data set is 0-15. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 525 
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Table 2 
Determinant of Sales Growth in China and Russia 
China  Russia   
Explanatory Variables  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 1  Spec. 2 
Constant  - 0.638*** 
  (0.381) 
- 0.189 
  (0.260) 
  0.832** 
  (0.245) 
  0.856* 
  (0.222) 
Dummy variable for state 
ownership in 1999 
- 0.135 
  (0.158) 
- 0.161 
  (0.160) 
 
Dummy variable for 
controlling shares in hands 
of insiders 
  0.052 
  (0.069) 
  0.049 
  (0.70) 
Dummy variable for 
greater than 25% of equity 
in state ownership 
 
- 0.237*** 
  (0.127) 
- 0.239*** 
  (0.127) 
Change in (logarithm of) 
quantity of labor  
  0.842* 
  (0.301) 
  0.863* 
  (0.304) 
  1.342* 
  (0.192) 
  1.337* 
  (0.184) 
Change in (logarithm of) 
stock of capital 
  0.424* 
  (0.139) 
  0.405* 
  (0.142) 
  0.002 
  (0.041) 
  0.002 
  (0.040) 
Percentage of capital stock 
that is less than 5 years old 
  0.006 
  (0.004) 
  0.006 
  (0.004) 
- 0.001 
  (0.002) 
- 0.001 
  (0.002) 
Dummy variable for domestic 
competition 
- 0.238*** 
  (0.123) 
- 0.258** 
  (0.123) 
- 0.038 
  (0.080) 
- 0.038 
  (0.080) 
Dummy variable for 
international competition 
- 0.014 
  (0.194) 
  0.003 
  (0.192) 
- 0.087 
  (0.071) 
  0.087 
  (0.071) 
Restructuring achieved by the 
firm since 1995 (China) or 
since 1997 (Russia) 
  0.006 
  (0.004) 
    0.002 
  (0.011) 
 
Industry that the firm 
belongs to 
  Yes    Yes    Yes**    Yes** 
Region/location of the firm    Yes    Yes    Yes*    Yes* 
R-square    0.2592    0.2533    0.4209    0.4208 
F statistic 
(Prob > |F|) 
  4.63 
  (0.00) 
  4.71 
  (0.00) 
  7.80 
  (0.00) 
  8.12 
  (0.00) 
N    137    138    275    275 
Note:  1) The values within the parentheses are the standard errors. 
  2) *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1  
    percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels of significance. 
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Table 3 
Determinant of Proportional Sales Growth in China and Russia 
China Russia   
Explanatory Variables  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 1  Spec. 2 
Constant  - 0.105** 
  (0.047) 
- 0.039 
  (0.031) 
  0.095* 
  (0.032) 
  0.097* 
  (0.029) 
Dummy variable for state 
ownership in 1999 
- 0.009 
  (0.019) 
- 0.013 
  (0.019) 
 
Dummy variable for 
controlling shares in hands 
of insiders 
  0.004 
  (0.007) 
  0.004 
  (0.007) 
Dummy variable for 
greater than 25% of equity 
in state ownership 
 
- 0.027** 
  (0.011) 
- 0.025** 
  (0.011) 
Change in (logarithm of) 
quantity of labor  
  0.085* 
  (0.032) 
  0.088* 
  (0.033) 
  0.141* 
  (0.021) 
  0.141* 
  (0.020) 
Change in (logarithm of) 
stock of capital 
  0.063* 
  (0.017) 
  0.060* 
  (0.018) 
- 0.001 
  (0.004) 
- 0.001 
  (0.004) 
Percentage of capital stock 
that is less than 5 years old 
  0.001*** 
  (0.000) 
  0.001** 
  (0.000) 
- 0.0002 
  (0.0002) 
- 0.0002 
  (0.0002) 
Dummy variable for domestic 
competition 
- 0.032*** 
  (0.017) 
- 0.035** 
  (0.017) 
- 0.007 
  (0.010) 
- 0.007 
  (0.010) 
Dummy variable for 
international competition 
- 0.008 
  (0.022) 
- 0.005 
  (0.022) 
  0.003 
  (0.007) 
  0.003 
  (0.007) 
Restructuring achieved by the 
firm since 1995 (China) or 
since 1997 (Russia) 
  0.001* 
  (0.0005) 
    0.0002 
  (0.001) 
 
Industry that the firm 
belongs to 
  Yes    Yes   Yes**    Yes** 
Region/location of the firm    Yes    Yes    Yes*    Yes* 
R-square    0.3129    0.3030    0.3866    0.3865 
F statistic 
(Prob > |F|) 
  4.84 
  (0.00) 
  4.50 
  (0.00) 
  7.22 
  (0.00) 
  7.52 
  (0.00) 
N    137    138    275    275 
Note:  1) The values within the parentheses are the standard errors. 
  2) *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1  
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Table 4 
Determinants of Growth of Sales in Russia 
1997-98 1998-99   
Explanatory Variables  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 1  Spec. 2 
Constant    0.2205 
  (0.2386) 
  0.2016 
  (0.2062) 
  0.5477* 
  (0.1289) 
  0.5624* 
  (0.1151) 
Dummy variable for controlling shares 
in hands of insiders 
  0.0028 
  (0.0703) 
  0.0030 
  (0.0699) 
  0.0445 
  (0.0563) 
  0.0429 
  (0.0574) 
Dummy variable for greater than 25% 
of equity in state ownership 
  0.0018 
  (0.0809) 
  0.0019 
  (0.0807) 
  0.0011 
  (0.0853) 
- 0.00004 
  (0.0851) 
Logarithm of quantity of labor    0.8691* 
  (0.2107) 
  0.8752* 
  (0.2062) 
  1.1937* 
  (0.1457) 
  1.1904* 
  (0.1403) 
Logarithm of stock of capital    0.0763*** 
  (0.0424) 
  0.0759*** 
  (0.0427) 
- 0.0802** 
  (0.0337) 
- 0.0801* 
  (0.0336) 
Percentage of capital stock that is less 
than 5 years old 
- 0.0002 
  (0.0014) 
- 0.0002 
  (0.0014) 
- 0.0007 
  (0.0014) 
- 0.0007 
  (0.0014) 
Dummy variable for domestic competition  - 0.0583 
  (0.0666) 
- 0.0584 
  (0.0667) 
  0.0364 
  (0.0580) 
  0.0369 
  (0.0573) 
Dummy variable for international 
competition 
  0.0455 
  (0.0631) 
  0.0454 
  (0.0630) 
  0.0321 
  (0.0662) 
  0.0323 
  (0.0659) 
Measure of restructuring achieved by the 
firm since 1997 
- 0.0020 
  (0.0074) 
    0.0015 
  (0.0084) 
 
Industry that the firm belongs to    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Region/location of the firm    Yes*    Yes*    Yes*    Yes* 
 
R-square    0.2201    0.2199    0.2927    0.2927 
F statistic 
(Prob > |F|) 
  4.10 
  (0.00) 
  4.27 
  (0.00) 
  8.00 
  (0.00) 
  8.30 
  (0.00) 
N    275    275    279    279 
Note:  1) The values within the parentheses are the standard errors. 
2) *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent, 5   
     percent and 10 percent levels.  
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Table 5 
Determinants of Growth of Sales in Russia 
Explanatory Variables  1997-99 
Constant    1.5334 * 
  (0.2439) 
Dummy variable for controlling shares in hands of insiders    0.0817 
  (0.0723) 
Dummy variable for greater than 25% of equity in state 
ownership 
- 0.2258 *** 
  (0.1250) 
Change in quantity of labor during 1997-99    1.2026 * 
  (0.1740) 
Change in stock of capital during 1997-99    0.0019 
  (0.0428) 
Percentage of capital stock that is less than 5 years old  - 0.0024 
  (0.0021) 
Dummy variable for domestic competition  - 0.0567 
  (0.0829) 
Dummy variable for international competition    0.0259 
  (0.0791) 
Measure of restructuring achieved by the firm since 1997    0.0031 
  (0.0029) 
Industrial growth during 1997-99    0.0039 
  (0.0029) 
Proportion of debt that was overdue in 1998  - 0.0072 
  (0.0049) 
Unemployment in 1998  - 0.0669 * 
  (0.0139) 
Per capita gross regional product in 1997  - 0.0087 
  (0.0085) 
Index of legislative quality in 1997  - 0.0394 *** 
  (0.0203) 
Industry that the firm belongs to    Yes ** 
R-square    0.4366 
F statistic 
(Prob > |F|) 
  8.92 
  (0.00) 
N    223 
Note:  1) The values within the parentheses are the standard errors. 
2) *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero  
   at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels.  
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